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ENFORCING CONTRACTS IN 
DYSFUNCTIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS: 
THE CLOSE RELATIONSIDP BETWEEN 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ORDERS 
A Reply to McMillan and Woodruff 
Ariel Porat* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When the public order is dysfunctional, a private order for en­
forcing contracts will develop. In the absence of courts, transactors 
will seek ways to secure performance without recourse to legal sanc­
tions. Social and economic sanctions imposed on the party in breach, 
whether by the aggrieved party or by the economic and social commu­
nity in which both parties operate, replace legal sanctions. These sanc­
tions sometimes arise within a private order functioning spontane­
ously, as when ongoing contractual relationships prevail between the 
parties, or when a close-knit economic or social community exists in 
which information concerning breaches of contract flows freely. In 
other cases, sanctions will be enforced within an organized private or­
der, in which market intermediaries and trade associations enable in­
formation to flow and thereby provide transactors with the security es­
sential for entering contracts. John McMillan and Christopher 
Woodruff have examined the characteristics of the private order that 
emerges in response to a dysfunctional public order, and the private 
order's influence on transactors.1 Their article relies mainly on em-
* Professor of Law and Director of the Cegla Institute, Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv Uni­
versity. L.L.B. 1983, J.S.D. 1990, Tel Aviv University. - Ed. I am grateful to Assaf Jacob, 
Ron Harris and Omri Yadlin for their helpful comments and suggestions. Thanks are also 
due to Ms. Batia Stein for her linguistic editing work. 
1. See John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private Order Under Dysfunctional 
Public Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2421 (2000). Writers differ on the priority of public order 
over private order. For the view that "the justification for centralized law [which is similar 
to the "public order" terminology used in these comments] begins with the identification of a 
failure in the incentive structure of social norms," see Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law 
for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1643-44 (1996); Robert D. Cooter, The Theory of Market Moderni­
zation of Law, 16 lNT'L REV. L. & ECON. 141 (1996). For a preference of public order, see 
Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (1996). 
For a critical comment on both Cooter and Posner, see Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering 
Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1745 (1996). For a preference of private order over public or­
der because the latter produces legitimate and illegitimate rules, while the former generally 
produces legitimate rules, see Jonathan R. Macey, Public and Private Ordering and the Pro-
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pirical studies conducted by the authors in Vietnam and in several 
Eastern European countries. They start with the assertion that, for 
various reasons, the public order is dysfunctional in these countries, 
and legal sanctions enacted against the party in breach are therefore 
ineffective. They examine how private order arises in response to this 
purported deficiency, and analyze the interaction between public and 
private orders when both function concurrently. This paper responds 
to their work by focusing on some of the contours of the relationship 
between public and private orders. 
In the real world, one cannot draw a distinct line between coun­
tries where a public order operates and countries where a private one 
obtains - both orders tend to function in every country, in varying 
degrees. This occurs because, when enforcing contracts, no public or­
der is ever perfect to the point of making the private order redundant. 
Indeed, the public order need not be at the brink of collapse in order 
for a private order to materialize. A private order may emerge even 
when the public order is only partially dysfunctional, or when dysfunc­
tionality is limited to specific types of transactions. The character of 
the private order, its scope, and its components, are inextricably re­
lated to the reasons leading to the emergence of a private order in the 
first place. Hence, a comprehensive theory about the emergence of a 
private order, whether as replacement for or complement to public 
order, needs to consider the various reasons for the dysfunctionality of 
the public order, which resulted in the creation of the private order in 
the first place. 
In Part II, I suggest reasons for the dysfunctionality of the public 
order, and show that dysfunctionality is usually partial. I then exam­
ine the relationship between the reasons for the dysfunctionality of the 
public order and the characteristics of the private order emerging in 
response; this may be considered a proposal for further empirical re­
search aiming to examine the nature of this relationship. 
Since a private order always operates beside the public one, a 
question arises concerning the interaction between them.2 In Part III, 
I examine how the content of the law operating within the public or­
der might affect the concurrent private order. The law operating 
within the public order may support the private order, repress it, or, at 
times, acknowledge its existence but endorse a neutral attitude toward 
it. At the same time, the private order may also affect, through its 
own mechanisms, the character and content of the public order. In the 
course of discussing the interaction between the two orders, I also 
consider whether, when the court awards damages for breach of con-
duction of Legitimate and Illegitimate Legal Rules, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1123 (1997). The 
classic, pioneering work that discusses the advantages of private order is ROBERT C. 
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991). 
2. See McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 1, at 2446-55. 
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tract within the framework of the public order, it should deduct from it 
the value of the sanction imposed by the private order on the party in 
breach. I point out the advantages of such a deduction, particularly 
the efficient incentives it provides to the contractual parties. 
I touch briefly on the interaction between the public order and the 
social networks functioning within the private order in Part IV. I at­
tempt to explain McMillan and Woodruff's finding that social net­
works constitute a substitute for the public order in the sense that, 
when the public order is stronger, reliance on social networks lessens.3 
Part V provides a brief conclusion. 
II. REASONS FOR A DYSFUNCTIONAL PUBLIC ORDER AND TIIE 
REsPONSE OF TIIE PRIVATE ORDER 
Parties will consider a public order ideal if the courts (and the en­
forcers of the courts' decisions) enforce all contracts according to the 
substantive law preferred by the parties without incurring costs of liti­
gation, with great speed and expertise, without bias, without mistakes, 
and without the parties incurring damages through litigation pro­
ceedings. 
No empirical studies seem required to determine that these condi­
tions are never actually present to a perfect degree. Hence, parties to 
a contract will never view a public order as ideal, and potential trans­
actors will naturally seek ways of overcoming the failings of the public 
order. Typically, their work takes place at two levels: to amend the 
flaws of the public order directly, and to develop a private order acting 
beside, or altogether replacing, the public order. 
The reaction of potential transactors depends on the character of 
the flaws affecting the public order and hindering its functioning. 
These flaws may be "generalized" - that is, equally relevant to all po­
tential transactors, such as when all judges in a system are corrupt. 
More frequently, however, at least in Western legal systems, flaws may 
be deemed "partial" - that is, their harmful effects are context-bound 
or industry-specific. Thus, in a given industry, such as the diamond in­
dustry, where transactors may be particularly sensitive to the public 
exposure entailed by litigation, they may develop a private order to 
avoid the need for litigation in the courts.4 In contrast, in an industry 
where the risk of exposure is lower (or nonexistent), transactors may 
not be as reluctant to resort to the courts. Similarly, another industry, 
3. See id. at 2451. 
4. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations 
in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 134-35 {1992} [hereinafter Bernstein, The 
Diamond Industry]. 
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such as the grain and feed industry,5 may find dissatisfaction with the 
actual substantive law operating in the public order, and consequently 
traders may seek an alternative system applying a different law. This 
sense of dissatisfaction may not be shared by traders in another indus­
try, with different characteristics, who are comfortable with the sub­
stantive law applied by the courts. 
In the following sections, I examine several typical flaws impairing 
the functioning of the public order. These flaws fall under three ru­
brics: flaws relating to judges, flaws relating to court decisions, and 
flaws relating to legal proceedings. The discussion will consider sev­
eral possible responses to these flaws within both the public and the 
private orders. Note that several flaws may operate simultaneously, 
either as "generalized," or as "partial" flaws. 
A. Flaws Relating to Judges 
A potential and particularly serious reason for dysfunction in the 
public order relates to the corruption of the judges, their biases, or 
their lack of professionalism. In these cases, it may be assumed that 
plaintiffs who believe they will profit from these flaws will use legal 
proceedings, whereas those who fear they will lose because of these 
flaws will not. Plaintiffs who cannot foresee whether they will benefit 
or suffer from the corruption or the lack of professionalism may be de­
terred by the uncertainty and forego legal proceedings altogether. 
Others may forsake recourse to the public order because they are out­
raged by the corruption of the system, regardless of whether or not it 
works in their favor. Finally, since these disputes involve contracts, a 
party fearing unfair treatment in legal proceedings may attempt, ab 
initio, to preclude recourse to the public order. 
A private order may develop in all these cases, as private actors at­
tempt to overcome the problems of a corrupt or unprofessional public 
order. If the problem is limited to the judges' lack of professionalism, 
without necessarily entailing general corruption in the public order, 
and provided that judgments are plausibly enforced, we may expect 
institutions of arbitration to develop, staffed by professional (and 
assumedly uncorrupt) arbitrators. As long as the public order pro­
vides a reasonable way of enforcing the arbitrators' rulings, the prob­
lem of unprofessional judges might be solved. 
If, however, corruption in the public order extends to enforcement, 
arbitration alone will not suffice because its effectiveness depends on a 
proper system of enforcement. A more extensive private order will 
develop. Potential transactors will seek ways of implementing non-
5. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search 
for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 {1996) [hereinafter Bernstein, Im­
manent Business Norms]. 
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legal economic and social sanctions, which will replace legal sanctions 
and which will be imposed by the aggrieved parties and by the com­
munity, either spontaneously or in organized fashion.6 
B. Flaws Relating to Court Decisions 
Enforcement of contracts by the public order may be impaired also 
because of flaws relating to court decisions. Three types of flaws may 
fall in this group: flaws resulting from information problems in the 
courts; flaws due to the application of a substantive law that the par­
ties find unsatisfactory; and flaws due to courts' refusal to enforce cer­
tain agreements. 
1. Information Problems Impairing the Court's Ability to 
Enforce Contracts Effectively 
Courts sometimes lack information required to rule on contractual 
disputes, thus making it highly questionable whether their decisions 
can properly reflect the parties' rights and duties. For example, in the 
diamond industry, as we learn from Lisa Bernstein's study, it is ex­
tremely difficult for the seller to prove lost opportunities due to the 
breach.7 Consequently, courts ruling on this type of transaction award 
low amounts of damages, resulting in undercompensated sellers and 
underdeterred buyers. Sellers will therefore seek alternative forms of 
protection, ex post and ex ante. 
Several consequences may ensue when the functioning of the pub­
lic order is impaired due to information problems leading to under­
compensation. In the public order, we may expect improvements in 
the courts' handling of information problems. Courts awarding dam­
ages may become more accommodating when applying the certainty 
of damages requirement,8 or may tend to award compensation for lost 
chances more frequently,9 or may be more generous when the sum of 
the damages is at the discretion of the court (for instance, when 
6. See McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 1, at 2426-32. 
7. See Bernstein, The Diamond Industry, supra note 4, at 136. Sometimes the secrecy 
consideration will make sellers reluctant to disclose this information in the courts. See id. at 
134-135. See also Omri Ben-Shahar & Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law, 
109 YALE LJ. 1885 (2000) (arguing that secrecy interest deters aggrieved parties from suing 
for breach of contract, leading to underdeterrence of parties in breach). 
8. On the requirement of certainty and the courts' tendency to relax it in certain cases, 
see u.c.c. § 1-106 {1999); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 {1981); E. 
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 829-34 (3d ed. 1999); JAMES J. WlilTE & ROBERT S. 
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 379-81 (4th ed. 1995). 
9. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, at 834. The classic case in which an English court 
awarded damages for lost chances to a winner in a preliminary round in a beauty contest is 
Chaplin v. Hicks, 2 K.B. 786 (1911); see also Rombola v. Cosindas, 220 N.E.2d 919 (Mass. 
1966). 
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awarding damages for nonpecuniary losses or when deciding on the 
validity of a liquidated damages clause). 
Furthermore, we may expect parties potentially affected by prob­
lems of information to adopt measures to preempt them. Classic con­
tractual tools offer a relatively moderate measure, such as setting a 
liquidated damages clause covering damages hard to prove in court. 
Assuming courts will not insist on the aggrieved party proving actual 
losses as a prerequisite for enforcing the liquidated damages clause,10 
information problems relating to the magnitude of the losses - but 
not to the existence of a breach - will be alleviated. 
At times, however, this may prove insufficient. Parties facing 
problems of proof may prefer to send their disputes to arbitrators who 
are familiar with the relevant market and who remain unconstricted 
by rigid rules of evidence.11 We may also expect an expansion of 
mechanisms used to gather relevant information (for arbitrators or 
judges), such as prices and quality, the types of losses caused by 
breach, the ability of the aggrieved party to cover or mitigate damages, 
and so on. For instance, if diamond sellers have difficulty proving 
losses incurred due to breaches of contract, information-gathering 
mechanisms may provide the court or the arbitrator with statistical 
data enabling them to award compensation for lost opportunities or 
for lost chances. 
The most far-fetched response to the information problem is the 
development of a full private order imposing social or economic sanc­
tions by the relevant community. Information channels, some sponta­
neous and some organized (such as business networks or trade asso­
ciations), should emerge.12 Information channels created for enforcing 
economic sanctions may also serve two additional purposes. First, 
they allow transactors to locate suitable contractual parties.13 Second, 
they supply information to arbitrators or courts. For example, a trade 
association that gathers information necessary for the imposition of a 
nonlegal sanction may, in the course of its work, acquire information 
about prices, quality of products, trade usages, courses of performing 
contracts, courses of mitigating damages, and types of losses entailed 
by breach of contract. This information may be used by the court (or 
10. See U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1999); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 
(1981 ). Both sections direct courts to consider the reasonableness of the liquidated damages 
clause in light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of 
proving loss. The U.C.C. adds another consideration which is "the inconvenience or nonfea­
sibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy." U.C.C. § 2-718(1). Accordingly, courts 
can use the anticipated damages and the difficulties of proof as the main considerations, and 
ignore the exact amount of the actual loss, when proof is so problematic. 
11. See David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. 
REV. 373, 409-10 (1990) [hereinafter Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions]. 
12 See McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 1, at 2426-32. 
13. This also holds true for social networks. See infra Part IV. 
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the arbitrator) when dealing with the dispute before it. In this fashion, 
mechanisms operating in the private order contribute to the strength­
ening of the public order. In the course of time, a more effective pub­
lic order may lessen the need for a private order. By using informa­
tion gathered under the private order, however, the public order 
increases the overall benefits accruing from these private-order 
mechanisms. In turn, these mechanisms may expand and reinforce the 
private order. Hence, this is a dynamic process, with one order sup­
porting and strengthening the other but, at the same time, itself be­
coming stronger and decreasing the need for the other. 
2. The Parties' Dissatisfaction with the Substantive 
Law Applied in Court 
Parties to a contract may seek alternatives outside the public order 
because they find the substantive law applied in the courts unsatisfac­
tory. First, the parties may fear that the substantive values upheld by 
the courts differ irreconcilably from their own. Thus, Orthodox Jews 
may be suspicious of courts, knowing them to be guided by secular law 
rather than by Jewish Law. Second, parties to a contract may fear that 
the court will not enable them to realize their will as expressed in the 
contract. Thus, traders in the grain and feed industry, who wish their 
legal disputes to be decided strictly according to the express terms of 
the contract, may fear that the court will permit course of perform­
ance, course of dealing, and usage of trade to trump express written 
terms.14 Third, the parties may not be satisfied with the remedies pro­
vided by the court. Fourth, parties to a contract may find that the law 
applied by the court is ambiguous and uncertain, dominated by vague 
standards instead of bright line rules, thus impairing their reliance and 
planning ability.15 
The parties' reluctance to resort to the public order may be con­
fronted in two ways - either the courts or the parties will adapt. 
First, the public order may try to improve its ways to make them ac­
ceptable to the parties. For example, if traders expect application of 
the express terms of the contract, the court will refrain from imposing 
norms of good faith and cooperation on their relationship. If the par­
ties do not expect the written contract to exhaustively delineate their 
rights, the court will develop rules and doctrines intended to meet this 
expectation. Thus, courts will develop rules of interpretation for ex-
14. See Bernstein, Immanent Business Norms, supra note 5, at 1787-815. 
15. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Value Creation 
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2001) [herein­
after Bernstein, The Cotton Industry] (arguing that the clarity of the rules applied by tribu­
nals operating in the cotton industry makes them more attractive to parties than courts ap­
plying the more vague legal rules of the U.C.C.). 
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arnining the course of dealing and the course of performance;16 they 
will introduce flexibility in applying the parole evidence rule;17 they 
will apply broadly the principle of good faith in performance;18 and 
they will develop the principle of interpretation presently applied to 
standard contracts, according to which the reasonable expectation of 
the parties can trump the written terms of the contract.19 If traders 
expect usage of trade to apply to their relationships, the court can rec­
ognize this usage as part of the contract between them.20 
Second, for their part, parties to a contract can attempt to have the 
substantive law desirable to them applied by courts. Thus, they will 
state in the contract the rules that will apply to their relationship, and 
hope that the court will respect it. At times, the public order may con­
sider their statement void when the chosen substantive law appears to 
violate public policy (for instance, when it discriminates against 
women, limits basic freedoms, or is injurious to third parties). The 
parties may also find it too difficult and onerous to clarify their wishes, 
and will renounce this attempt beforehand. 
Notably, both these responses, by the courts and by the private 
parties, occur within the public order only. They do not require the 
development of a private order. One may nevertheless emerge, how­
ever - for example, a private order may offer arbitrations that ensure 
the parties the application of their desired substantive law.21 Arbitra­
tion mechanisms available in the diamond, grain, feed, and cotton in­
dustries provide examples.22 Tribunals in the Jewish Orthodox com­
munity (called "Courts of Justice") are another example. In these 
tribunals, rabbi-judges rule according to Jewish Law and often resort 
to social sanctions (such as boycotting and exclusion). Dissatisfaction 
with substantive law may also contribute to the development of a 
wider private order where we will find economic and social sanctions. 
16. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(3), {11), 1-205, 2-208 {1999); RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS §§ 219-223 {1981). 
17. The trend in modem contract law is toward a less formal application of the parole 
evidence rule. This trend is reflected in U.C.C. § 2-202 {1999), and in RESTATEMENT 
{SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§§ 209-217 {1981); see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, at 435; 
Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561 {Cal. 1968). 
18. See u.c.c. § 1-203 (1999); RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). 
19. See RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 211 {1981); Darner Motor Sales v. 
Universal Underwriters, 682 P.2d 388 (Ariz. 1984). 
20. See u.c.c. §§ 1-201{3), {11), 1-205 {1999); REsTATEl\IBNT {SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS§§ 219-222 (1981). 
21. See Chamy, Nonlegal Sanctions, supra note 11, at 409-10. 
22 See Bernstein, The Diamond Industry, supra note 4, at 126-27; Bernstein, Immanent 
Business Norms, supra note 5, at 1771-78; Bernstein, The Cotton Industry, supra note 15. 
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3. The Public Order Consciously Refuses to Enforce 
Certain Agreements 
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In some areas, the litigating parties are not reluctant to resort to 
the public order, but the public order refuses to enforce their agree­
ments. The refusal may be due to legislators' or judges' perceptions of 
these contracts as detrimental to third parties (agreements to commit 
a tort23), to the parties themselves (agreements made under duress or 
unconscionable agreements), or to society at large (agreements in re­
straint of trade24). In other cases, the courts will not enforce agree­
ments because judicial interference might be harmful to the relations 
between the parties (agreements between spouses25). In some cases, 
the courts' refusal to enforce agreements may be justified by the policy 
against encouraging litigation or interfering with the judicial process.26 
Potential transactors, who may nevertheless wish to enter into legally 
unenforceable agreements, must rely on nonlegal sanctions. 
C. Flaws Relating to Legal Proceedings 
Flaws relating to legal proceedings may lead potential transactors 
to refrain from using the public order for enforcing contracts. These 
flaws include the costs of litigation, the long waiting periods until en­
forcement takes place, and the damage incurred by the legal proceed­
ings. 
1. The Costs of Litigation 
Certain types of disputes do not reach the courts due to the high 
cost of legal proceedings on the one hand, and the low value (to the 
parties) of the issue involved on the other. This forms a prominent 
feature of many consumer transaction disputes. The public order may 
respond by enabling class action suits or by awarding generous puni­
tive damages, thus increasing the profitability of turning to the courts 
and creating an effective sanction against traders. The public order 
alternatively may establish small claims courts, where legal proceed­
ings are not costly. Finally, a private order (such as consumer organi-
23. See, e.g., Williams v. Wtlson, 181 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Ark. 1960); Sayres v. Decker 
Auto. Co., 145 N.E. 744 (N.Y. 1924). 
24. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 186 (1981). 
25. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, at 337-43. 
26. See, e.g., Plumlee v. Paddock, 832 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (refusing to en­
force contract whereby attorneys would pay owner of ambulance company for injury case 
referrals); Garden State Plaza Corp. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 189 A2d 448 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1963) (refusing to enforce contractual provision that forbade using previous negotia­
tions and dealings between the parties to interpret the contract). 
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zations) may develop, mainly designed to provide information about 
traders' reputation. 
2. Long Waiting Periods until the Enforcement 
Long waiting periods at the courts also contribute to the dysfunc­
tionality of the public order, and result in enforcement that comes 
years after the conflict erupted. Transactors thus may find the litiga­
tion procedure in the public order irrelevant to their needs. They will 
prefer arbitrations with shorter waiting periods,27 they will develop a 
private order for enforcing arbitration rulings implementing nonlegal 
sanctions,28 or at times they may be satisfied with the imposition of 
economic or social sanctions without using arbitration. 
3. The Damage Incurred by Legal Proceedings 
Often parties to a contract do not want to go to court because legal 
proceedings, as such, are damaging. Damages incur primarily from 
the public exposure entailed by a legal proceeding, because this expo­
sure may harm the litigants' privacy or reputation, or it may reveal 
trade secrets. The public order may respond by allowing proceedings 
in certain disputes to take place "behind closed doors." This presents 
a problematic solution, however, constitutionally as well as practically. 
A more viable solution involves the development of legal rules that 
strengthen the parties' substantive and procedural rights of privacy, 
that protects their trade secrets, and that protects their reputation. 
In the private realm, we may expect many referrals to arbitration, 
where confidentiality is more easily maintained. Lisa Bernstein's 
study of the diamond industry shows that the secrecy ensured in arbi­
tration proceedings provides a strong incentive for parties to refrain 
from turning to the courts.29 Of course, parties often will develop a 
private order that imposes economic and social sanctions without re­
sorting to involvement with a third party (either a judge or an arbitra­
tor), and thereby avoid any potentially injurious exposure that could 
result therefrom. 
Legal proceedings may also break up relationships, whether busi­
ness or social. For this reason, parties to relational contracts establish 
various mechanisms that enable them to contend with setbacks with-
27. See Bernstein, The Cotton Industry, supra note 15 {"The availability of a fast and 
inexpensive way of obtaining and enforcing a judgement, transforms some meritorious 
claims that would have had a negative expected value had they been pursued in litigation 
into claims with a positive expected return."). 
28. See id. 
29. See Bernstein, The Diamond Industry, supra note 4, at 124, 134-35. 
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out destroying the relationship.30 When no such mechanisms are 
available, economic and social sanctions imposed under the private 
order may preserve their relationships. 
ill. REsPONSES OF CONTRACT LAW TO THE PRIVATE ORDER 
The type of private order developed is contingent not only on the 
flaws affecting the public order, but also on the attitude of the law (as 
applied by courts within the public order) toward the private order. 
The law applied by courts can influence the private order in several 
ways. It can encourage it and even seek its support, it can fight it and 
attempt to repress it, and it can recognize it and show consideration 
for it without attempting to influence its existence or its scope.31 The 
less serious the flaws of the public order and, consequently, the more 
effective its operation, the higher the chances that the attitude of the 
law operating within it will influence the private order. 
This Part explores the influence of the law applied by courts on the 
development of the private order. Section III.A describes how the 
public order actively encourages the private order, and Section III.B 
describes how it also represses the private order. In Section III.C I 
make a normative suggestion regarding how the public order can 
adapt itself to an existing private order by taking nonlegal sanctions 
into account when meting out legal ones. This would constitute a neu­
tral attitude toward the private order, the third type of stance a public 
order might- or does - take. 
A. Encouraging the Private Order 
Contract law supplies the parties with tools for mutual protection 
without requiring them to resort to the courts. These arrangements 
presuppose that, since the public order does not act immediately and 
its protection is often lacking and incomplete, the parties must take 
steps to enforce contractual obligations by themselves. The rules 
dealing with order of performance provide a good example. These 
rules guide the parties as to how to protect themselves from nonper­
formance by the other party. Thus, parties to a contract can condition 
their performance so that one will not be under a duty to perform its 
30. See IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN 
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 24-25, 31 (1980); Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of 
Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465 (1985); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in 
Business, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963). 
31. Cf. Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947 
(1997) (discussing, inter alia, the ways law or state can ignore, strengthen, or undermine so­
cial norms); Posner, supra note 1, at 1725-36 (discussing several approaches to the problem 
of dealing with inefficient social norms). 
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obligation without receiving equivalent performance by the other.32 
Even if the parties do not condition their performance, contract law 
enables one party who has reasonable grounds to believe that she will 
not receive performance from the other to demand adequate assur­
ance of due performance, and even suspend performance until she re­
ceives such assurance.33 These rules, then, rely on the assumption that 
the public order cannot supply immediate and effective protection to a 
contractual party - since if it could, the order of performance would 
be dictated solely by the needs of the transaction rather than by the 
parties' need for assurance. The public order, then, acknowledges the 
limitations of its enforcement, and encourages the parties to protect 
themselves without it. 
Furthermore, the public order supplies the parties with self­
enforcing remedies that also strengthen their ability to enforce their 
mutual obligations without recourse to courts. Examples of such 
remedies include offset, price deduction,34 and possessory lien.35 In 
some cases, the power to rescind a contract also protects the parties 
without resorting to the court, as does the power to forfeit a deposit.36 
True, all these arrangements take place under the aegis of the public 
order, which controls their implementation and sets their boundaries. 
Hence, this is not strictly private order, although it does bear the 
marks of one. 
The public order further supports and encourages the private or­
der by giving effect to norms and institutions that control the private 
order within the framework of the public order. It thereby increases 
the benefits of these norms and institutions to its consumers, and pro­
motes their improvement and development. For example, the public 
order allows arbitrations. The lesser its involvement in the arbitrators' 
decisions, the stronger the institutions of arbitration and the greater 
their usefulness. The public order also offers the contractual parties 
default rules for their contracts, compatible with their trade usages, 
and courts interpret their contracts relying on these usages. Courts 
also take into account the parties' "course of dealing" and "course of 
performance" when interpreting the contract and filling its gaps.37 As­
suming that contractual parties consider it advantageous to settle their 
32 See FARNSWOR1H, supra note 8, at 561-62. 
33. See U.C.C. § 2-609 {1999); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 251 {1981); 
FARNSWOR1H, supra note 8, at 613-16. 
34. See U.C.C. § 2-717. 
35. See U.C.C. §§ 7-209, 7-3rr7. 
36. See U.C.C. § 2-718{2). 
37. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(3), {11), 1-205, 2-208; REsTATEMENT {SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 
219-223 {1981). 
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disputes according to these norms of behavior,38 and that they are 
aware of the possibility of finding themselves within the public order, 
their benefit from using private-order norms will increase. The public 
order thereby contributes to the development of norms within the pri­
vate order, and ultimately strengthens the private order as a whole. 
The ability of the public order to influence the development of 
norms within the private order can be illustrated as follows. Let us as­
sume that the prevalent practice in the furniture industry is that, when 
certain defects in the manufacturer's goods appear, retailers need not 
pay, whereas they do when other defects appear. Assume further that 
this practice remains in the initial stages of development, and some 
vagueness prevails concerning its mode of implementation. . If the 
public order shows willingness to enforce this practice in contractual 
disputes, potential transactors interested in court enforcement of this 
practice will want it to be verifiable, namely, provable in court. As a 
result, the trade association may attempt to document the practice and 
perhaps even to regulate it precisely, thus contributing to its en­
trenchment and strengthening. 
The public order may further reinforce the private order indirectly 
by using information-gathering mechanisms that work within the pri­
vate order and that yield information useful to the functioning of the 
public order.39 Although the private order thereby will support the 
public one, the private order itself may strengthen as the augmented 
usefulness (to both orders) of the information-gathering mechanisms 
increases the incentives to create and support those mechanisms in the 
first place.40 
B. Repressing the Private Order 
The public order will repress the private order when it perceives 
the latter as bad and damaging, either to its participants or to third 
parties. In extreme cases, it will use criminal law or antitrust law to 
38. But see Bernstein, Immanent Business Norms, supra note 5, at 1796-802 (arguing 
that traders in the grain and feed industry would expect that course of performance and 
course of dealing will not trump the express terms of the contract at an end-game dispute). 
For a critical view of Bernstein's argument, see David Chamy, Illusions of a Spontaneous 
Order: "Norms" in Contractual Relationships, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1841, 1853-57 (1996). 
39. See supra Section II.B.1. 
40. McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 1, at 2450, write: "Effective courts . • .  lower the 
benefit of information gathering, resulting in less well-informed manufacturers." I believe 
that this is not necessarily the case. In fact, a functioning public order suffering from infor­
mation problems may increase the benefits of information gathering, since this information 
is useful not only to the private but also to the public order. Actually, there is a trade-off 
here: Effective courts lower the benefits of information gathering for the use of the private 
order, but, at the same time, increase the benefits of information gathering to a public order 
that has become functional yet retains inadequate methods of information-gathering. 
McMillan & Woodruff's claim, then, becomes stronger as the need for information in the 
public order lessens. 
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repress the private order, although less radical means can also be en­
visaged. 
One way to repress the private order involves limiting the applica­
tion of private-order norms within the public order (that is, in courts), 
even when the parties wish otherwise. The courts may refuse to apply 
the private-order norms by finding them illegal or against public pol­
icy, or by ignoring them when interpreting the contract or filling its 
gaps.41 Assuming that parties find these norms desirable, the lack of 
recognition by the public order will decrease the expected benefits of 
those norms and consequently the incentives to develop them; as a re­
sult, the private order will be weakened. On the other hand, the op­
posite is also possible, namely, that parties acting according to these 
norms will redouble their efforts not to reach the public order and will 
settle their disputes outside it. Hence, in that situation, the hostility of 
the public order to the parties' wishes would actually strengthen the 
private order. 
Another approach that represses the private order, usually uncon­
sciously, grants legal effect to parties' behavior according to private­
order norms that the parties had not wanted effectuated. This deters 
parties from behaving according to these private-order norms. For 
example, traders sometimes act according to norms of cooperation 
created within the framework of a private order that go beyond the 
express terms of the contract, yet they nonetheless wish disputes be­
tween them to be settled according to the express terms only.42 If the 
court, oblivious to this desire of the parties, grants legal effect to their 
cooperative behavior toward each other and permits the "course of 
performance" to trump the contract's express terms, the parties may 
neglect cooperation norms a priori and thereby impair the functioning 
of the private order that relies on these norms. 
A decision of the Israeli Supreme Court may illustrate the damage 
that could be inflicted on a private order by "legalizing" behaviors that 
were not intended to lead to legal consequences of any kind. In Levin 
v. Levin,43 a husband and wife reached an alimony agreement stating 
that the husband would pay alimony beyond the minimum sum pre­
scribed by law. The couple was going through a crisis, but they still 
trusted one another and strove to settle their disputes without re­
course to the courts. For this purpose, they specifically stated in the 
agreement that it did not create a legal relationship and should not be 
presented to the court. Later, when the wife relied on this agreement 
41. See, e.g., Flower City Painting Contractors, Inc. v. Gumina Constr. Co., 591 F.2d 162 
(2d Cir. 1979) (preferring the reasonable understanding of one party to the usage of trade 
prevailing in the industry). 
42 See Bernstein, Immanent Business Norms, supra note 5, at 1796-802 (distinguishing 
relationship-preserving norms from end-game norms). 
43. C.A. 3833/93, Levin v. Levin, 48(2) P.D. 862 (1994). 
August 2000] Enforcing Contracts 2473 
in an alimony suit, the question arose as to whether the court should 
enforce it. The Supreme Court of Israel answered in the affirmative, 
finding the provision that denied the creation of a legal relationship 
unenforceable for public policy considerations.44 Recognizing the le­
gal validity of the agreement, held the court, serves the worthy pur­
pose of enforcing promises. 
The objection to this decision is that, in "legalizing" the agreement, 
the Supreme Court of Israel weakened the moral and social institution 
of nonlegal promises. Whereas the private order prevalent before the 
ruling enabled spouses to make mutual promises confining sanctions 
to the social realm, in light of this ruling they can no longer do so 
without incurring the risk of ultimately reaching the courts. The "le­
galization" of their behavior and the drawbacks of the legal proceed­
ings they must expect because of this behavior are thus detrimental to 
the private order and contribute to its repression. After the decision 
in the Levin case, a husband considering giving or making a promise to 
give more than the minimum amount of alimony may decide not to do 
so, fearing that such behavior or promise would subsequently expose 
him to a law suit.45 
C. Recognizing the Private Order: The Mutual 
Relations Between Sanctions 
Even if the public order does not adopt a value-based position vis­
a-vis the private order, and does not attempt to influence it, the public 
order should nevertheless adapt itself to the existence of a private or­
der functioning beside it. In this Section, I try to address the following 
question: Should sanctions imposed by the private order on the party 
in breach be deducted from the compensation awarded by the court 
for breach of contract?46 This question is complex and deserves fur­
ther elaboration; what follows are merely preliminary thoughts on this 
matter. The following example illustrates the problem. 
John breached his contract with Tony. Tony suffered losses of 100. 
The breach of contract led to the imposition of a nonlegal sanction on 
John in the shape of injury to his reputation, which is valued at 40.47 
Should the court award Tony damages for an amount of 100, or only 
of 60? 
44. See id. 
45. For the view that courts should respect the parties' determination that their com­
mitments would not be legally enforceable, see Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions, supra note 11, at 
383-84. Cf. Melvin Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 CAL. L. REV. 
821 {1997) (arguing, inter alia, against legalization of the world of gift). 
46. For a thorough discussion of nonlegal sanctions - monetary, reputation-based and 
hybrid sanctions - see Bernstein, The Cotton Industry, supra note 15. 
47. Actually, evaluation is quite problematic in these cases, but I ignore this issue here. 
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The argument in favor of awarding 60 focuses on optimal deter­
rence to the party in breach. Given perfect information, optimal de­
terrence will be attained if John pays a price equivalent to the full loss 
caused by his breach, no less but also no more. Awarding damages of 
60 will lead to this result. In contrast, awarding damages of 100 will 
lead to the party in breach paying a price of 140, 40 higher than the 
loss caused by his breach. This results in overdeterrence.48 The objec­
tion to this argument, apparently supporting damages of 100, focuses 
on the undercompensation to the aggrieved party if he receives only 
60. Indeed, if the purpose of awarding damages for breach of contract 
is compensation, this objection is powerful. As we will see immedi­
ately, however, awarding damages of 60 is more efficient than dam­
ages of 100 and, therefore, the ex ante interest of both parties actually 
will be to deduct the private sanction from the public one. 
This conclusion rests in part on the different incentives supplied by 
the public and private orders. The nonlegal sanction imposed by the 
private order differs from the legal sanction in that it does not actually 
compensate the aggrieved party. How does this difference affect the 
incentives of the potentially aggrieved party?49 
Under contract law, aggrieved parties are entitled to full compen­
sation for the foreseeable losses they suffer due to breach of contract.50 
Given full compensation and perfect information, the deterrence to 
the party in breach is optimal. Because she receives full compensa­
tion, however, the aggrieved party remains indifferent to the breach of 
contract. She will not mitigate the damages before a breach occurs, 
even if it might be efficient to do so (the defense of mitigation of dam-
48. However, a counterargument could be raised, that the total losses caused by the 
breach are in the amount of 140, which includes losses to the aggrieved party and losses to 
the party in breach. Accordingly, efficiency requires the party in breach to internalize the 
total amount of 140; otherwise, he may breach inefficiently. Thus, to achieve perfect inter­
nalization of losses, he should pay 100 to the aggrieved party. Cf. Robert Cooter & Ariel 
Porat, Does Risk to Oneself Increase the Care Owed to Others? Law and Economics in Con­
flict, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 19 (2000) (arguing that in determining the duty of care in negligence 
law courts mistakenly ignore the reduction in the injurer's self risk caused by the injurer's 
precautions). 
This counterargument deserves further elaboration, in which I cannot engage here. The 
main weakness of the counterargument is that it treats the injury to reputation suffered by 
the party in breach as a social cost, while it is actually a private cost with a correlative benefit 
to society at large: the breach supplies information to society about the trustworthiness of 
the party in breach. For further elaboration, see Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Should Court 
Deduct Non-Legal Sanctions from Damages? (October 2000) (unpublished manuscript on 
file with author). 
For the argument that nonlegal sanctions may supplement legal sanctions and prevent 
underdeterrence, see Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions, supra note 11, at 407. 
49. For a discussion of the differences between legal and nonlegal sanctions with regard 
to the incentives they supply to parties to a contract, see id. at 400-03. 
50. Subject to some limitations, such as the requirement of certainty of damages and the 
"duty" to mitigate damages. Farnsworth, supra note 8, at 806-07, 829-30. 
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ages applies only from the time of the breach), she will overrely on the 
contract, and she will not take efficient precautions to prevent the 
breach (by cooperating with the other party, supplying him with in­
formation necessary to performance, and so on). 
A private order based on nonlegal sanctions supplies incentives for 
performance to the party in breach51 but, at the same time, supplies in­
centives to the aggrieved party to take efficient precautions. It creates 
incentives for the aggrieved party because, if the contract is neverthe­
less breached, the aggrieved party ends up without compensation. 
Knowing this beforehand, the aggrieved party will not remain indif­
ferent to a breach of contract. She will consider the possibility of a 
breach by the other party and will efficiently mitigate her damages 
even before a breach; she will not overrely and, at times, even will 
take efficient precautions necessary to prevent the breach.52 Thus, we 
could expect aggrieved parties operating in a private order, unlike 
those operating in a public order, to demonstrate greater care with re­
gard to mitigation of damages, reliance, and precautions adopted to 
prevent a breach.53 
If the analysis so far is accurate, the following question may arise: 
If efficiency is attained by charging the party in breach for losses suf­
fered by the aggrieved party, but without granting full compensation 
to the latter, why should not parties operating within the public order 
(wherein nonlegal sanctions are irrelevant) agree beforehand that the 
breaching party will pay the damages to a third party? The answer to 
this question is that such an agreement, even if it supplies efficient in­
centives to the parties after the contract is made, typically raises the 
overall costs of the contract. The reason is obvious: without a trans­
feral of the right to compensation to a third party, the consequences of 
a breach are that the party in breach pays, and the aggrieved party is 
compensated; with a transferal of the right to compensation to a third 
party, the consequences of the breach are that the party in breach 
pays, but the aggrieved party is not compensated. The latter arrange-
51. I do not refer here to the question of whether these sanctions are efficient. Cf. 
Bernstein, The Cotton Industry, supra note 15. 
52. Robert Cooter argues that when precaution is bilateral, parties would be supplied 
with the most efficient incentives if both were expected to bear the entire burden of the 
harm caused by the breach (or the wrongdoing). See Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, 
and Property, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1985). A private order that imposed on the party in 
breach sanctions equivalent to the losses caused by the breach and, at the same time, left the 
aggrieved party uncompensated, is very close to the optimal legal regime considered by 
Cooter. 
53. This actually may provide an additional explanation as to why parties to a contract 
operating within certain types of private orders are more cooperative than parties operating 
within public order. Indeed, knowing that she will bear her own losses in the event of 
breach, an aggrieved party will tend to cooperate with the other party and assist him in dif­
ferent ways, even if she does not feel obligated to do so. 
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ment doubles the costs of breach to the contractual parties since it ex­
ternalizes benefits to a third party. 
This fact alone, however, does not preclude the option that, in cer­
tain cases - apparently rare ones - parties to a contract may decide 
it is in their interest to pay the extra price in order to supply efficient 
incentives to both parties in the course of performing the contract.54 
Thus, we can envisage a situation in which the performing party thinks 
she may require some form of cooperation from the party receiving 
performance. She may find it difficult to formulate the precise terms 
of the situation requiring such cooperation, or she may fear that lack 
of cooperation on the part of the other party may not be verifiable 
(that is, provable in court) and perhaps even not observable (to the 
performing party). A solution that may therefore seem acceptable to 
the performing party is to deny the other party any compensation in 
case of a breach by transferring the right to compensation to a third 
party.ss This solution will ensure that the other party will not be indif­
ferent to the breach, and that his incentives will be efficient.s6 
To return to our example: Should a court deduct the nonlegal 
sanction of 40 that the private order imposed on John from the 100 re­
flecting the losses suffered by Tony? The result of such deduction is to 
impose a total sanction of 100 on John, which is the equivalent of 
Tony's losses, but which leaves Tony undercompensated. As noted, 
however, leaving the aggrieved party completely without compensa­
tion encourages her to mitigate damages efficiently before the breach, 
54. In the diamond industry, arbitrators may sometimes impose sanctions on the party 
in breach involving not only compensation to the aggrieved party but also a donation to 
charity. See Bernstein, The Diamond Industry, supra note 4, at 127. This system may be jus­
tified in that it provides the aggrieved party more efficient incentives than full compensation. 
55. For another solution, based on the apportionment of damages between the parties, 
see ARIEL PORAT, HAGANAT ASHAM TOREM BE-DINE HOZIM [CONTRIBUTORY FAULT IN 
THE LAW OF CONTRACT] (1997); Ariel Porat, Contributory Negligence in Contract Law: 
Toward a Principled Approach, 28 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 141 (1994); Ariel Porat, The 
Contributory Negligence Defence and the Ability to Rely on the Contract, 111 L. Q. REV. 228 
(1995). 
56. This solution obviously raises several difficulties, which cannot be discussed within 
the scope of these comments. For instance: How does a solution whereby the aggrieved 
party is not compensated, but the party in breach pays damages, affect compromises be­
tween the parties? How does it affect renegotiation? What incentives does it provide for 
the parties' opportunistic behavior? Another question concerns the incentive of the ag­
grieved party to initiate the imposition of sanctions on the party in breach when the ag­
grieved party derives no benefit from the imposition. On the latter issue, see Bernstein, The 
Cotton Industry, supra note 15 (clarifying the motivation of the aggrieved party to impose 
nonlegal sanctions on the party in breach, even if it yields no pecuniary gains to him), and 
see also McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 1, at 2430 (discussing the free rider problem, 
which decreases incentives to aggrieved parties to impose nonlegal sanctions, and possible 
ways to overcome it). In another (unpublished) paper I am co-authoring with Robert 
Cooter, we develop the idea of third party transfer contract, which we call an "anti-insurance 
contract." We argue that on some occasions, the parties can charge the third party (the 
"anti-insurer") a premium for transferring him the right to the damages in the event of a 
breach. 
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to avoid overreliance, and, at times, to take efficient precautions to 
prevent the breach. Leaving Tony partly uncompensated, which is the 
consequence of deducting the 40 from the 100, is more efficient than 
compensating him in full.57 Reducing the compensation imposed on 
John below 60 would supply more efficient incentives to Tony, but 
would also result in underdeterrence of John. A third solution, 
whereby John would be obliged to pay the 60 to a third party rather 
than to Tony, might have been optimal with regard to the parties' in­
centives after the contract was made, but would have increased the 
costs of the contract by increasing the costs of a breach. 
The deduction of 40 does not lead to an externalization of the con­
tract's benefit to a third party in a way that increases the costs of a 
breach to the parties, which would typically be unacceptable to either 
of them. Rather, this deduction is just another way, different from the 
traditional one, to allocate the losses incurred by the breach between 
the parties to the contract. 
In sum, deducting the nonlegal sanction imposed by the private 
order from the damages which reflect the losses of the aggrieved party 
supplies both parties with more efficient incentives than non­
deduction, without externalizing any benefits to third parties. 
IV. SOCIAL NETWORKS AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 
McMillan and Woodruff show that social networks function as a 
substitute for the public order in the sense that, as the public order is 
strengthened, social networks are weakened. This dynamic contrasts 
with that of business networks, which work in concert with the public 
order and supplement it. I will attempt to explain these findings by 
pointing out an important difference between social and business net­
works. 
Social networks sometimes require no sanction whatsoever in or­
der to be effective. This occurs when contractual parties are drawn 
from narrow social circles, such as close friends or relatives. In such 
cases, the choice of partner to a transaction relies on overlapping in­
terests: the partner's interest is not only to maximize her private util­
ity but rather her own and her partner's utility at the same time, as 
part of her own interest. Indeed, a partner to a transaction will be 
chosen from a narrow social network especially when the community 
or even the party to the transaction has relatively small chances of 
monitoring the partner's behavior. These networks are particularly 
57. Some of the problems mentioned in note 53, supra, are also present here. The 
evaluation of nonlegal sanctions is another problem. I also ignore here the effect of the de­
duction of the nonlegal sanction on the development of the private order. A thorough dis­
cussion of the relations between legal and nonlegal sanctions should address all these prob­
lems. 
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advantageous to contractual parties when the breach of the contract or 
the loss it entails is not verifiable or even observable.58 
As opposed to this important advantage, social networks present a 
drawback. Since the circle of potential parties remains relatively 
small, matching other relevant features of the partners (except for 
trustworthiness) will usually be less than optimal. McMillan and 
Woodruff's finding that social networks act as substitutes for the pub­
lic order, unlike business networks that act in concert with it, thus pre­
sents no surprise. Given the high price entailed by contracting 
through a social network, its use should be widespread, only when le­
gal or nonlegal economic sanctions are not available. Business net­
works do not present this problem because they increase the chances 
of finding a good partner in every regard (beyond trustworthiness), 
and indeed are sometimes strengthened by a functioning public order, 
whereas a social network may not be. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Responses in the private order differ according to the underlying 
reasons for a dysfunctional public order. Hence, if legal systems are 
dysfunctional due to the corruption of the judges, we may expect all 
forms of the private order to emerge: relational contracts, arbitration, 
business networks, trade associations, and social networks. 
If, however, the public order suffers mainly from information 
problems and a private order develops as a result, we may expect arbi­
trations and various information-gathering mechanisms to arise. The 
use that the public order makes of the information created by these 
mechanisms may actually lead to their reinforcement. 
If the public order does not function because of its failure to supply 
the parties with the substantive law they desire, we may expect arbi­
tration mechanisms to develop, applying a substantive law acceptable 
by the parties. If the public order is dysfunctional because of the costs 
of litigation, we may expect the emergence of mechanisms chiefly de­
signed to supply information about the transactors' reputation in the 
market. If the public order is dysfunctional because of the parties' 
reluctance to bear the damage of legal proceedings in courts, we may 
expect increased recourse to arbitration as well as reliance on nonlegal 
sanctions. 
The character of the private order and its components depends on 
the flaws prevailing in the public order, which prompted the private 
58. Cf. Bernstein, Immanent Business Nonns, supra note 5, at 1791-92 (arguing that 
when breach is observable but not verifiable, parties will prefer the extra-legal realm to the 
legal one). My argument is that social networks are effective even when breach is not ob­
servable either by third parties or by the aggrieved party. 
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order in the first place. A comprehensive theory of the private order 
must examine these flaws and their relationship with the public order. 
The contents of the law operative in the public order may influ­
ence the development of the private order. The public order may en­
courage the private order, and probably will, particularly given its 
awareness of its own limitations and flaws in contrast to the advan­
tages of the private order, and given its sincere desire to improve the 
situation. The private order will be repressed when the public order 
perceives it as more damaging than beneficial. The attitude of the 
public order toward the private order may depend on the flaws of the 
public order prompting the emergence of the private order in the first 
place. Thus, if the private order emerged in response to problems of 
information, we may assume that the public order will encourage the 
private one and, at times, even seek its assistance. If problems of sub­
stantive law caused the development of the private order, the public 
order may attempt to reform itself in order to meet the parties' needs, 
leading sometimes to the repression of the private order, and some­
times to its strengthening.59 If the private order developed due to the 
costs of legal proceedings, the public order may encourage the private 
one, among other reasons in an attempt to lighten its own burden and 
to make time and room for disputes that would justify the costs of le­
gal proceedings. If the private order developed due to the parties' fear 
of incurring damages due to legal proceedings, the public order may 
also encourage the private one because of its ability to settle real 
problems that cannot be resolved in the public order. The public or­
der, however, may also try to reform itself, thereby indirectly leading 
to the repression of the private order. 
The most extreme cases, wherein the public order will not encour­
age the private order and may even attempt to fight it (except for 
cases when it is socially harmful), occur when the private order was es­
tablished due to the corruption of the public order. In these cases, 
judges may approach the private order as a bad idea, even when it 
proves useful and beneficial to society. As the public order becomes 
less effective, however, so does its ability to influence the existence of 
a private order driven by social or economic forces beyond the reach 
of the courts. 
The public order may take into account the existence of the private 
order even without adopting a normative stand toward it. The public 
order's recognition of the sanctions imposed by the private order on 
the parties in breach will enhance efficiency. 
59. It could result in repression of the private order because, the better the public order, 
the less the need for a private one. It could sometimes lead to a strengthening of the private 
order, because acknowledging the norms of the private order within the public one may 
make the development of these norms more profitable. See supra Section ill.A. 
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The private order that will emerge beside the public order may in­
clude social networks, in addition to the economic ones. Yet, the bet­
ter the functioning of the public order, the lower the chances of exten­
sive recourse to social networks. 
The article by McMillan and Woodruff makes an important con­
tribution to the understanding of the functions fulfilled by the private 
order when the public order has failed, and to an understanding of cer­
tain interactions between the two orders. I have attempted to pose 
some additional questions, as well as offering several answers, con­
cerning the complex relationships between the public and private or­
ders. 
